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CLARITY AND RIGOR TO INTERMEDIATE 
SCRUTINY IN FIRST AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE? A PROPOSAL CUTTING 
ACROSS CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 
FOR TIME, PLACE & MANNER REGULATIONS  
CLAY CALVERT* & MINCH MINCHIN** 
Abstract 
When the government regulates the time, place, or manner of speech, it 
must satisfy intermediate scrutiny and prove that (1) it has a significant 
interest, (2) the regulation is narrowly tailored, and (3) ample alternative 
channels of expression remain open. This article advocates simplifying and 
improving this test in First Amendment jurisprudence by replacing the 
often-confused second and third prongs with the far less deferential and 
much more rigorous undue-burden test embraced by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 2016 in the abortion-regulation case of Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt. Incorporating the undue-burden standard maintains 
intermediate scrutiny’s balancing framework while simultaneously adding 
significant muscle, in free-speech-friendly fashion, to the test. First 
Amendment law long has borrowed from other constitutional domains, the 
article explains. Under this fact-intensive, benefits-and-burdens tack to 
intermediate scrutiny, the government must provide extensive factual 
evidence to support its claims, and courts, in turn, must refrain from 
deferring to lawmakers’ unsubstantiated assertions. 
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Introduction 
In a 2007 article examining tiers of scrutiny1 in First Amendment2 free 
speech jurisprudence, Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat observes that 
intermediate scrutiny3 “has attained central importance in the overall 
structure of free speech law.”4 Bhagwat points out that intermediate 
scrutiny “has been the standard of review in literally dozens of significant 
Supreme Court and courts of appeals cases over the past quarter century.”5 
Today, however, the entire tiers-of-review paradigm in First Amendment 
law is under fire in some quarters,6 and the justices, at times, disagree on 
                                                                                                                 
 1. The three traditional tiers of judicial scrutiny of government action in U.S. 
constitutional law are strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational-basis review. See 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, But Cf.: Medium Rare Scrutiny, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 397, 398 
(1998) (proposing, somewhat waggishly, “a new taxonomy to replace the inscrutable 
categories of ‘strict,’ ‘intermediate,’ and ‘rational basis’ scrutiny”); Christina E. Wells, 
Trends in First Amendment Jurisprudence: Beyond Campaign Finance: The First 
Amendment Implications of Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 66 MO. L. REV. 
141, 158 (2001) (describing the U.S. Supreme “Court’s multi-tiered system of judicial 
review” as consisting “of three levels of scrutiny—strict, intermediate, and rational basis—
all of which share the same general structure”). 
 2. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated more than 
ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental 
liberties to apply as against state and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. 
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 3. Several scholars have examined intermediate scrutiny of content-neutral laws, 
including Leslie Kendrick. See Leslie Kendrick, Nonsense on Sidewalks: Content 
Discrimination in McCullen v. Coakley, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 215, 238 (quoting Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)) (observing that the intermediate-scrutiny 
standard “has historically required that the law be ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest’ and that it leave open ‘ample alternative channels of 
communication’”). 
 4. Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 785. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Justice Stephen Breyer, for instance, opined in 2015 that “[t]he First Amendment 
requires greater judicial sensitivity both to the Amendment’s expressive objectives and to the 
public’s legitimate need for regulation than a simple recitation of categories, such as ‘content 
discrimination’ and ‘strict scrutiny,’ would permit.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 
2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring). Breyer proposes a more general balancing 
framework that asks “whether the regulation at issue works harm to First Amendment 
interests that is disproportionate in light of the relevant regulatory objectives.” Id. at 2235-
36. Framed slightly differently in another case, Breyer wrote that the Court “must sometimes 
look beyond an initial categorization. And, in doing so, it helps to ask whether a government 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss4/2
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which standard of review applies in a given case.7 Furthermore, strict 
scrutiny—what Professor David Han calls “the default rule” for “any 
content-based regulation”8—is proving somewhat less than fatal for statutes 
than once believed,9 as indicated by the 2015 high court decision in 
                                                                                                                 
action burdens speech disproportionately in light of the action’s tendency to further a 
legitimate government objective.” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 484 
(2009) (Breyer, J., concurring). Ultimately, Breyer contends that the Court’s doctrine 
referring to tiers of scrutiny should be used only “as guidelines informing our approach to 
the case at hand, not tests to be mechanically applied.” Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 
S. Ct. 1656, 1673 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring).  
A complete discussion of Justice Breyer’s critique of First Amendment tiers of review is, of 
course, beyond the scope of this article, but it suffices to say here that Harvard Professor 
Mark Tushnet refers to Justice Breyer’s approach as signaling the “partial de-
doctrinalization of the First Amendment.” Mark Tushnet, Justice Breyer and the Partial De-
Doctrinalization of Free Speech Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 508, 511 (2014); see also Vikram 
David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Voracious First Amendment: Alvarez and Knox in the 
Context of 2012 and Beyond, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 491, 497 (2013) (noting that Breyer tends 
to engage in a “free-form balancing approach”). 
Others have criticized the tiers of scrutiny as well. See, e.g., R. George Wright, What if All 
the Levels of Constitutional Scrutiny Were Completely Abandoned?, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 
165, 200 (2014) (“Tiered scrutiny inevitably invites overconfident judicial assessments of 
how important or unimportant some government interests, conceived of in any of several 
ways, ‘really’ are.”). 
 7. For example, in the abortion-facility buffer zone case of McCullen v. Coakley, 134 
S. Ct. 2518 (2014), the five-justice majority concluded that the statute in question was 
“neither content nor viewpoint based and therefore need not be analyzed under strict 
scrutiny.” Id. at 2534. In brief, the majority found the statute was “content neutral.” Id. In 
contrast, the late Justice Antonin Scalia contended in a concurring opinion that “content 
neutrality is far from clear (the Court is divided 5-to-4).” Id. at 2542 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
Scalia concluded “that the statute is content based and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.” 
Id. at 2545. 
 8. David S. Han, Transparency in First Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY L.J. 359, 396 
(2015). 
 9. The late professor Gerald Gunther famously suggested that under the leadership of 
Chief Justice Earl Warren, some equal protection cases were subjected to a form of review 
that “was ‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.” Gerald Gunther, Forward, In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
8 (1972); see also Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 
691-92 (2016) (“Describing the Supreme Court’s approach to content-based restrictions on 
speech is superficially simple. Laws that suppress speech on the basis of content are subject 
to the strictest constitutional scrutiny, which is often outcome determinative.” (emphasis 
added)); David G. Post, Sex, Lies, and Videogames: Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 
Association, 2010-11 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 27, 29–30 (noting that “every first-year law 
student dutifully learns” that strict scrutiny “is not only substantial, it is well-nigh 
insurmountable” (emphasis added)). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
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Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar.10 Additionally, strict scrutiny is variously 
criticized as vague and under-theorized,11 as well as “internally 
variegated,”12 “highly impressionistic and, at times, seemingly 
indeterminate.”13  
The intermediate-scrutiny standard of review—the focus of this article 
and the test generally applicable to content-neutral regulations14 affecting 
the time, place, and manner (“TPM”) of speech15—also finds itself caught 
in the crosshairs of scholarly criticism.16 For example, Professor Ronald 
Krotoszynski asserts that 
                                                                                                                 
 10. 135 S. Ct. 1656 (upholding, in the face of strict scrutiny and by a five-to-four 
decision, a Florida Code of Judicial Conduct canon that forbids candidates for judicial office 
in Florida from personally soliciting campaign funds). Writing for the majority, Chief Justice 
John Roberts called it “one of the rare cases in which a speech restriction withstands strict 
scrutiny.” Id. at 1666. 
 11. Professor Richard Fallon asserts that: 
The incomplete theorization of the decision to adopt the strict scrutiny formula 
as the baseline test for protecting fundamental rights lives on in the test’s 
operative terms: They remain crucially vague and thus capable of varying 
applications from one Justice and one case to another. The Supreme Court has 
never squarely confronted, much less solved, the conundrum of the level of 
generality at which to specify compelling governmental interests. Neither has 
the Court noted the ambiguities built into the narrow tailoring requirement. 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1336 (2007). 
 12. Aziz Z. Huq, Preserving Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 COLUM. 
L. REV. SIDEBAR 16, 16 (2012). 
 13. Matthew D. Bunker et al., Strict in Theory, but Feeble in Fact? First Amendment 
Strict Scrutiny and the Protection of Speech, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 349, 350 (2011). 
 14. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) (observing that “laws 
that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views 
expressed are in most instances content neutral”); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 
475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (quoting Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)) (asserting that content-neutral laws are “those that ‘are justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech’”). 
 15. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (finding that “even in 
a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or 
manner of protected speech,” and setting forth the intermediate-scrutiny test that applies to 
such restrictions); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002) 
(observing “that municipal ordinances receive only intermediate scrutiny if they are content 
neutral”); see also Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint Discrimination: Malleable 
Terms Beget Malleable Doctrine, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 131, 131–32 (2008) (asserting that 
the Supreme Court “has devised tests to review content-based and content-neutral 
regulations (strict scrutiny for content-based regulations, a more lenient intermediate 
scrutiny for those regulations deemed content neutral)” (emphasis added)). 
 16. See, e.g., Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as 
Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 301 (1998) (asserting that “intermediate 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss4/2
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[o]n its face, the time, place, and manner doctrine appears at 
least fairly solicitous of free speech: A standard of review that is, 
in essence, intermediate scrutiny presents a high bar indeed. As 
the doctrine has evolved over time, however, the criteria set forth 
by the Supreme Court often present the government with only 
minor impediments—mere speed bumps along the path to 
suppression of even core political speech.17 
The Supreme Court fashioned today’s common iteration of intermediate 
scrutiny more than thirty years ago in Clark v. Community for Creative 
Non-Violence.18 There, the Court held that content-neutral laws pass 
constitutional muster only if they are “narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest”19 and “leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication of the information.”20 Chief Justice John 
Roberts reiterated this formulation of intermediate scrutiny in 2014 when 
writing for the majority in McCullen v. Coakley.21 Federal appellate courts 
today also use this framing of intermediate scrutiny.22 
The Court, it should be noted, has articulated slightly different 
formulations of intermediate scrutiny for symbolic speech regulations23 and 
                                                                                                                 
scrutiny has been consistently critiqued by judges and scholars who point to its 
indeterminacy and its invitation to judicial activism”). 
 17. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Clint A. Carpenter, The Return of Seditious Libel, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 1239, 1260 (2008). 
 18. 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
 19. Id. at 293. 
 20. Id.  
 21. 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014). 
 22. See, e.g., Lone Star Sec. & Video, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 827 F.3d 1192, 1197 
(9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293) (asserting that “the government may impose 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in traditional public fora” if “the 
restrictions are content neutral, are ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest,’ and ‘leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information’”); Reynolds v. Middleton, 779 F.3d 222, 225–26 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting 
Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 555 (4th Cir. 2013)) (“Content-neutral 
time, place, and manner regulations of speech in traditional public forums are subject to 
intermediate scrutiny—that is, the restrictions must be ‘narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest and leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication.”).  
 23. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (observing, in the context of 
a case involving the burning of a draft registration certificate, that a government regulation is 
permissible “if it is within the constitutional power of the Government,” “furthers an 
important or substantial governmental interest” that “is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
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restrictions imposed on truthful advertising.24 Those versions of 
intermediate scrutiny, however, are beyond the scope of this article, which 
concentrates, instead, on intermediate scrutiny as applied to content-neutral 
TPM regulations.25  
A content-neutral TPM regulation targets “the circumstances of speech 
rather than the content of the speech.”26 As the Supreme Court wrote in 
                                                                                                                 
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest”); see also Susan Dente Ross, 
Reconstructing First Amendment Doctrine: The 1990s Revolution of the Central Hudson and 
O’Brien Tests, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 723, 729 (2001) (observing that “in United 
States v. O’Brien, the Court refused to overturn a conviction for draft-card burning and 
established the intermediate scrutiny test for content-neutral laws that incidentally infringe 
symbolic speech”).  
 24. The U.S. Supreme Court adopted a four-part test for commercial speech that 
requires courts to 
determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For 
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern 
lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted 
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we 
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental 
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve 
that interest. 
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servs. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); see 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (describing “the intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson”); 
Goldberg, supra note 9, at 705 (“Restrictions on truthful commercial speech are subject to 
intermediate scrutiny, and can be regulated if the restriction directly advances a substantial 
governmental interest and is substantially related to achieving the interest.”); Tamara R. 
Piety, Market Failure in the Marketplace of Ideas: Commercial Speech and the Problem 
That Won’t Go Away, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 181, 182 (2007) (“[T]he commercial speech 
doctrine creates a category of speech subject to intermediate scrutiny under the First 
Amendment.”).  
 25. Some scholars argue that the Supreme Court has collapsed the different 
intermediate-scrutiny tests deployed for time, place, and manner regulations and symbolic 
speech “into a single, combined standard that apparently applies to almost all cases 
involving content-neutral regulations.” Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the 
First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 636 (1991); see Bhagwat, supra note 4, at 802 
(asserting that there is “no doubt that the courts of appeals increasingly seem to accept the 
existence of a single, overarching standard of First Amendment scrutiny called ‘intermediate 
scrutiny,’ which has emerged as a synthesis of the various distinct bodies of Supreme Court 
doctrine”); Nancy J. Whitmore, The Evolution of the Intermediate Scrutiny Standard and the 
Rise of the Bottleneck “Rule” in the Turner Decisions, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 25, 82–83 
(2003) (describing “the Supreme Court’s practice of conflating the O’Brien rule and the 
time, place and manner standard”).  
 26. Williams, supra note 25, at 637.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss4/2
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Ward v. Rock Against Racism,27 “[a] regulation that serves purposes 
unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an 
incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”28 
The strict- and intermediate-scrutiny standards both focus on government 
interests and narrow tailoring. In strict scrutiny, the government interest 
must be compelling,29 while in intermediate scrutiny it need only be 
significant.30 In terms of the tailoring or fit between the government’s 
asserted interest and the statute that serves it, strict scrutiny demands that 
the statute restricts no more speech than is absolutely necessary to serve the 
interest,31 while the fit does not need to be quite so precise under 
intermediate scrutiny.32 
The intermediate-scrutiny test, however, adds a third consideration or 
prong not found in strict scrutiny—namely, that the regulation “leave open 
ample alternative channels for communication of the information.”33 As 
Professor R. George Wright observes in a 2015 article, “It seems well 
settled that content-neutral, but not content-based, restrictions on speech 
must leave ample alternative channels available for conveying the speaker’s 
message.”34 Professor Susan Williams concurs, noting that “the adequate 
alternatives branch of the test is unique.”35 
                                                                                                                 
 27. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
 28. Id. at 791 (emphasis added). 
 29. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (observing that strict 
scrutiny demands that a regulation “is justified by a compelling government interest and is 
narrowly drawn to serve that interest” (emphasis added)). 
 30. See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014). 
 31. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“If a less 
restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that 
alternative.” (emphasis added)); Sable Commc’ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The 
Government may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order 
to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the 
articulated interest.” (emphasis added)); see also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, 
Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2422 
(1996) (“A law is not narrowly tailored if there are less speech-restrictive means available 
that would serve the interest essentially as well as would the speech restriction.”). 
 32. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 798 (explaining that “a regulation of the time, place, or 
manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate, 
content-neutral interests but that it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means 
of doing so” (emphasis added)). 
 33. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
 34. R. George Wright, Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations of Speech: A 
Distinction That Is No Longer Worth the Fuss, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2081, 2088 (2015) (emphasis 
added). The ample-alternative-avenues-of-communication prong is not, however, part of the 
intermediate scrutiny test fashioned by the Supreme Court in United States v. O’Brien, 391 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
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Intermediate scrutiny’s alternative-channels-of-communication prong 
comports with Professor Geoffrey Stone’s observation three decades ago 
that “[t]he Court’s analysis of content-neutral restrictions is designed 
primarily to assure that adequate opportunities for free expression remain 
open and available. This is essential for the preservation of a vital and 
robust public debate.”36 Finding alternative avenues of communication for 
speech today, Professor Patrick Garry contends, should be relatively easier 
than in the past due to “the proliferation of alternative channels for 
communication”37 and, in particular, to the “explosive growth of new 
communications technologies.”38  
Professor Wright, however, asserts that a critical problem wrought by 
this third prong is “the difficulty of distinguishing the idea of alternative 
speech channels from the genuinely separate idea of one degree or another 
of narrow tailoring.”39 The key distinction between the second and third 
prongs of intermediate scrutiny, Wright points out, is that narrow tailoring 
forces courts to consider “alternative government regulations of speech,”40 
while the third prong concentrates on the alternative methods of 
communication that remain available in the face of the government 
regulation.41 Put differently, the second prong (narrow tailoring) compels 
courts to consider alternative ways to regulate the speech at issue, while the 
third prong directs them to contemplate alternative means and modes to 
communicate that speech.  
The Supreme Court indicated more than two decades ago in City of 
Ladue v. Gilleo42 that the ample-alternative-channels prong entails 
                                                                                                                 
U.S. 367 (1968), for cases involving symbolic speech. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Free 
Speech, Occupational Speech, and Psychotherapy, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 681, 703 (2016) 
(citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791) (“Assuming the government’s claim of content-neutrality is 
justified, it may regulate the time, place, and manner of speech whenever this restriction is 
‘narrowly tailored to a significant government interest’ and ‘leave[s] open[] ample 
alternative channels of communication’ (an additional factor not in O’Brien’s version of 
intermediate scrutiny).” (alterations in original)). 
 35. Williams, supra note 25, at 644. 
 36. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 117 (1987). 
 37. Patrick M. Garry, The First Amendment and Non-Political Speech: Exploring a 
Constitutional Model That Focuses on the Existence of Alternative Channels of 
Communication, 72 MO. L. REV. 477, 524 (2007). 
 38. Id. at 504. 
 39. Wright, supra note 34, at 2090 (footnote omitted). 
 40. Id. at 2091. 
 41. Id.  
 42. 512 U.S. 43 (1994). 
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considering whether “adequate substitutes exist”43 for conveying a message 
when compared to the mode of communication the government “has closed 
off.”44 Whether a substitute mode of communication is adequate, the Court 
noted, requires evaluation of its cost and convenience,45 as well as its 
effectiveness in conveying a message to a speaker’s targeted or desired 
audience.46 
Perhaps even more troubling regarding the ample-alternative-channels 
prong than its conflation with the narrow-tailoring facet, Professor Wright 
contends, is that it carries the bizarre47 potential to transform intermediate 
scrutiny into a more rigorous standard of review than strict scrutiny.48 He 
reasons here that 
a requirement that a regulation leave open anything such as 
ample alternative speech channels in the case of content-neutral 
speech regulations immediately destroys any hierarchy of rigor, 
exactingness, or stringency between the two tests. Nothing 
prevents a court, relying on the ample available alternative 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. at 56. 
 44. Id.  
 45. See id. at 57 (noting that the mode of communication closed off in Gilleo—namely, 
residential yard signs—constitutes “an unusually cheap and convenient form of 
communication. Especially for persons of modest means or limited mobility, a yard or 
window sign may have no practical substitute”). 
 46. See id. (“Furthermore, a person who puts up a sign at her residence often intends to 
reach neighbors, an audience that could not be reached nearly as well by other means.”). 
 47. The authors use the term “bizarre” because intermediate scrutiny is supposed to be a 
less demanding standard of review than strict scrutiny. As Professor Jeffrey Shaman 
explains: 
Whereas strict scrutiny requires the showing of a compelling state interest to 
sustain a law, intermediate scrutiny prescribes a less demanding standard that 
calls for the showing of an important or substantial state interest to sustain a 
law. And while strict scrutiny requires that legislative means be absolutely 
necessary to accomplish their ends, intermediate scrutiny expects that 
legislative means be carefully tailored, though not absolutely necessary, to 
accomplish their ends. In practice, intermediate scrutiny has proven to be less 
severe than strict scrutiny and in numerous cases when using intermediate 
scrutiny the Court has upheld laws challenged on First Amendment grounds. 
Jeffrey M. Shaman, Rules of General Applicability, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 419, 461 
(2012) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 48. Wright, supra note 34, at 2092 (asserting that “an alternative speech channels 
requirement can impose different and more stringent free speech requirements than can even 
the most exacting narrow tailoring requirements,” such that “a content-neutral regulation test 
requiring ample alternative speech channels can be more demanding than a content-based 
regulation test requiring a compelling interest and narrow tailoring”). 
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speech channels requirement, from imposing a more demanding 
test under content-neutrality than under a content-based test.49 
This possibility arises, in part, because of the malleable and amorphous 
meaning of “ample” in assessment of alternative channels of 
communication. Wright avers here that “there is room for judicial discretion 
in applying the test in practice, as well as generous room for variations in 
how, precisely, this requirement is to be formulated in the first place.”50 He 
notes that in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,51 the majority and 
dissent deployed several different and competing interpretations of what is 
necessary to satisfy the ample-alternative-channels prong.52 This comports 
with Boston University Professor Jay Wexler’s more general observation 
that the intermediate-scrutiny test is “particularly vulnerable to 
manipulation by the Supreme Court.”53 
If Professor Wright is correct that the ample-alternative-channels facet of 
intermediate scrutiny serves “to undermine the meaningfulness of the 
judicially created binary distinction between content-neutral and content-
based regulations of speech,”54 then either one of two things must happen to 
remedy the predicament. One possibility—an extreme one55—is for the 
Supreme Court simply to jettison the distinction between content-neutral 
and content-based laws altogether and, in its place, perhaps adopt 
something akin to Justice Stephen Breyer’s proportionality approach for 
considering the constitutionality of all laws targeting speech.56 An 
alternative tack—the one proposed here for scholarly consideration—is to 
reformulate the tests for either or both intermediate and strict scrutiny in 
such a way that the distinction between content-neutral and content-based 
laws and, in turn, between intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny, 
becomes meaningful. In addition, such a reformulation must ensure that 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. at 2089. 
 50. Id. at 2093 (footnote omitted). 
 51. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
 52. Wright, supra note 34, at 2093. 
 53. Wexler, supra note 16, at 301. 
 54. Wright, supra note 34, at 2101–02.  
 55. The authors consider this an extreme approach because “[c]onstitutional law 
students, professors, and judges alike are infatuated with the notion of tiers of scrutiny.” Josh 
Blackman, The Burden of Judging, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1105, 1193 (2014). 
 56. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (addressing Justice Breyer’s 
proportionality approach). 
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Strict Scrutiny 
compelling interest served by the least speech-restrictive 
means possible 
Intermediate Scrutiny 
significant interest served without causing an undue 
burden on speech 
intermediate scrutiny is meaningfully different and more rigorous than a 
mere rational basis standard.57 
Specifically, this article proposes leaving intact the current strict-scrutiny 
standard—the government must continue to prove both a compelling 
interest and that the means serving it restrict no more speech than is 
necessary—but reworking the intermediate-scrutiny test. In particular, this 
article recommends retaining the significant-interest component of 
intermediate scrutiny but discarding both the narrow-tailoring and ample-
alternative-channels prongs of the test.  
In their place, the authors advocate implementing a version of the 
Supreme Court’s undue-burden test. It was most recently applied by the 
majority in June 2016 in the abortion-restriction case of Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt58 and first adopted twenty-five years ago in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.59  
In brief, the authors’ proposed intermediate-scrutiny test has two prongs, 
rather than the current three. This simplifies matters and avoids conflation 
of the second and third prongs of the current intermediate-scrutiny test. The 
proposed standard requires the government to prove both that it has a 
significant interest in regulating speech and that the regulation it adopts 
does not impose an undue burden on First Amendment interests. Thus, as 
suggested here and as compared to the current strict-scrutiny test, the 
standards would be 
 
 
      
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                 
 57. Although purportedly a more stringent standard than rational basis review, 
intermediate scrutiny does not always live up to that billing. See Lillian R. BeVier, The First 
Amendment on the Tracks: Should Justice Breyer Be at the Switch?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1280, 
1293 (2005) (asserting that “intermediate scrutiny has become the practical equivalent of 
lenient, rational basis review”). 
 58. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 59. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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Part I of the article provides a primer on the evolution of the undue-
burden standard within the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence, 
concentrating on the Court’s significant development of that test’s meaning 
in Hellerstedt. Part II then illustrates that First Amendment jurisprudence 
long has borrowed standards from other constitutional domains, thus 
providing context for the article’s proposal to import into free speech law a 
component of the Court’s abortion-related jurisprudence. Next, Part III 
explores the potential application of the undue-burden standard in the realm 
of First Amendment intermediate scrutiny, attempting to identify variables 
and factors that courts might use in determining if, in fact, a content-neutral 
regulation imposes an undue burden on speech. Finally, Part IV concludes 
by encapsulating the potential of the undue-burden standard to improve 
First Amendment intermediate scrutiny and by calling for other scholars to 
offer suggestions for how the undue-burden test might be adjusted and fine-
tuned to fit within the free-speech framework. 
I. Abortion and the Constitutional Right to Choose: Evolution 
of the Undue-Burden Test 
The origins of the undue-burden standard trace back more than half a 
century to Griswold v. Connecticut.60 In the case, just as in Hellerstedt, 
Planned Parenthood found itself embroiled in a reproductive-rights 
controversy before the Supreme Court.61 Griswold challenged the 
prosecution of a physician and the executive director of the Planned 
Parenthood League of Connecticut, both of whom ran afoul of two Nutmeg 
State laws62 criminalizing the use (or abetting the use) of contraceptives.63 
At issue was whether the statutes violated the Fourteenth Amendment and, 
more specifically as framed for the majority by Justice William O. 
Douglas,64 whether prohibiting the dissemination of information regarding 
                                                                                                                 
 60. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 61. Id. at 480.  
 62. In particular, the statutes provided that “[a]ny person who uses any drug, medicinal 
article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than 
fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined 
and imprisoned,” and “[a]ny person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands 
another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal 
offender.” CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (repealed 1971). 
 63. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.  
 64. Justice Douglas initially framed the issue as a Fourteenth Amendment matter, 
writing that “we are met with a wide range of questions that implicate the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 481. He ultimately decided the case, however, 
using multiple amendments. Id. at 484. 
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contraceptives violated the “sacred precincts of marital bedrooms”65 in 
contravention of the Due Process Clause.66  
Although Douglas had, in the words of Professor Kenneth Karst, “a 
number of more traditional doctrinal threads” from which to choose, he 
instead wove “the opinion from gossamer of his own.”67 In six poignant 
pages, Douglas knit a unifying thread through precepts of the First, Third,68 
Fourth,69 Fifth,70 and Ninth71 Amendments72 to declare that “the right of 
privacy which presses for recognition here is a legitimate one.”73  
In the process of invalidating the Connecticut laws, the Douglas majority 
did not rely on fundamental liberty interests under the Due Process Clause, 
but rather on the “penumbras, formed by emanations” from the Bill of 
Rights that give the right to privacy “life and substance.”74 By taking this 
indirect and much-maligned75 approach to recognizing the constitutional 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. at 485. 
 66. Id. at 481. 
 67. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 653 
(1980). 
 68. The Third Amendment to the U.S. Constitution establishes that “[n]o Soldier shall, 
in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of 
war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.” U.S. CONST. amend. III.  
 69. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that “[t]he right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment was 
incorporated more than half a century ago through the Due Process Clause as a fundamental 
freedom to apply to all government actors. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Mapp 
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  
 70. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o 
person shall. . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment right not to be a witness against oneself was 
incorporated about fifty ago through the Due Process Clause as a fundamental liberty to 
apply as against all state agents and agencies. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).  
 71. The Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, in its entirety, that “[t]he 
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. IX.  
 72. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
 73. Id. at 485. 
 74. Id. at 484. 
 75. See, e.g., Robert G. Dixon, The “New” Substantive Due Process and the 
Democratic Ethic: a Prolegomenon, 1976 BYU L. REV. 43, 84 (wryly referring to how 
Justice Douglas “skipped through the Bill of Rights like a cheerleader—‘Give me a P . . . 
Give me an R . . . Give me an I . . .’ and so on, and found P-R-I-V-A-C-Y as a derivative or 
penumbral right”). 
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guarantee of privacy, Douglas attempted to distance himself from the 
stigma of Lochner-era76 substantive due process77 claims,78 which similarly 
fostered the discovery and fundamentalization of unenumerated rights from 
normative cultural elements.79  
                                                                                                                 
 76. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), invalidated a New York statute limiting 
the number of hours bakers could work each week. The Court concluded the law interfered 
with the fundamental-yet-unenumerated liberty of contract between workers and their 
employers. Id. at 64. Lochner spurred the Court into a three-decade span of increased 
judicial intervention into economically related legislative action, commonly known as the 
Lochner era. This jurisprudential zeitgeist, which emphasized substantive due process claims 
and dominated early twentieth-century jurisprudence, has since received significant criticism 
from legal scholars. As Stephen Kanter explained:  
Lochner and its economic substantive due process doctrine have become 
constitutional boogeymen. It is difficult to find anyone with a good word to say 
about the extent of the Court’s Lochnerian interventionist period. The critics of 
Lochner do not always agree on the precise defects of economic substantive 
due process, but the nearly universal rejection of the doctrine . . . serves as an 
important cautionary flag for any theory of substantive individual liberty rights 
that looks primarily to the Due Process Clause as the source of those rights. 
Stephen Kanter, The Griswold Diagrams: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Rights, 
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 671 (2006) (footnote omitted). 
 77. Substantive due process claims, which use the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to address whether the government has a justifiable rationale for depriving a 
person’s life, liberty, or property, are perhaps best explained by the late Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist. He wrote, “[W]e have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause 
specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ 
such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’” Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (citations omitted) (first quoting Moore v. City of 
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); then quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 
325, 326 (1937)). This method of finding fundamental enumerated rights, although 
controversial, is part of standard constitutional doctrine. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 571–73 (5th ed. 2015).  
 78. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481–82 (opining that “[o]vertones of some arguments 
suggest that Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, should be our guide. But we decline that 
invitation . . . . We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and 
propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions”). 
 79. See Helen Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review: Haunted by the Ghost 
of Lochner, 61 WASH. L. REV. 293, 305 (1986) (explaining that “Justice Douglas wrote the 
opinion of the Court, using the penumbra rationale to avoid the stigma of Lochner. Three 
other justices wrote concurring opinions, leaving the Griswold rationale in fragmented 
confusion” (footnotes omitted)); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, at 850 (“In an 
attempt to avoid substantive due process, Douglas, who had lived through the Lochner era, 
found privacy in the ‘penumbra’ of the Bill of Rights. This approach has been much 
criticized and has not been followed by subsequent cases.”).  
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Less than a decade later, the Supreme Court used part of Griswold’s 
rationale as a launching pad80 to address the constitutionality of abortion 
itself in Roe v. Wade.81 The case challenged a Texas law banning abortions 
except in instances implicating the mother’s life.82 Writing for the majority, 
Justice Harry Blackmun first established that the choice to obtain an 
abortion is an inherently private matter.83 He then reasoned that because 
Griswold established privacy as a fundamental right, abortion, which is 
subsumed within privacy, is likewise fundamental.84 Weighing the interests 
in strict-scrutiny-like fashion,85 Blackmun explained that whenever 
“‘fundamental rights’ are involved, the Court has held that regulation 
limiting these rights may be justified only by a ‘compelling state interest,’ 
and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the 
legitimate state interests at stake.”86 
Once the fundamental nature of abortion rights was established, 
Blackmun qualified their scope in light of competing interests.87 He 
explained that 
a State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding 
health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting 
potential life. At some point in pregnancy, these respective 
interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of 
the factors that govern the abortion decision. The privacy right 
involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute.88 
                                                                                                                 
 80. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the 
Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 55 (2003) (“Griswold was 
a particularly important step toward the Court’s announcement and enforcement of a 
woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy in Roe v. Wade.”). 
 81. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
 82. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 1191, 1192, 1193, 1194, 1196, invalidated by Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 83. Roe, 410 U.S. at 151–52. 
 84. Id. at 154–55.  
 85. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, at 855 (explaining that the “Court said that strict 
scrutiny was to be used in striking the balance because the right to abortion was a 
fundamental right”). 
 86. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (citations omitted).  
 87. In this case, Justice Blackmun opined, the Texas statutes furthered legitimate 
government interests, yet they also went too far and “outstripped these justifications and 
swept ‘far beyond any areas of compelling state interest.’” Id. at 156 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 
314 F. Supp. 1217, 1222-23 (1970), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).  
 88. Id. at 154. 
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The “some point in pregnancy” at which governmental interests of 
prenatal life and maternal health and safety89 reach sufficient importance 
was the second trimester.90 Attempting to balance all the interests involved, 
then, Roe established a trimester-based approach to ascertaining the 
constitutionality of abortion regulations.  
In the first trimester, governments could only regulate abortions akin to 
any other medical procedure—i.e., mandating their performance by 
licensed doctors.91 The onset of the second trimester, however, triggered a 
trio of compelling governmental interests in maternal health, safety, and 
prenatal life, thus allowing governments to regulate—although not entirely 
restrict—abortions.92 At the start of the third trimester, Justice Blackmun 
explained, “the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human 
life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion.”93 
The constitutional basis for the trimester framework deviated sharply 
from the penumbral rationale that gave the right of privacy constitutional 
footing in Griswold. Blackmun relocated the unenumerated right of privacy 
into the purview of substantive due process,94 a decision that attracted 
critics from both the pro-choice and pro-life camps.95  
                                                                                                                 
 89. The Court attempted to establish that, based upon available data, abortions 
performed after the second trimester were more likely to result in health-compromising 
complications. Id. at 163. 
 90. Foreshadowing what would transpire nearly two decades later in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the Roe Court 
stated that, “[w]ith respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life, 
the ‘compelling’ point is at viability.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. Yet the established proxy for 
viability became the rigid, trimester-based framework. Id.  
 91. Id. at 150. 
 92. Id. The Court further explained that “[t]hese interests are separate and distinct. . . . 
[A]t a point during pregnancy, each becomes ‘compelling.’ With respect to the State’s 
important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the ‘compelling’ point, in the 
light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester.” Id. at 
162-63. 
 93. Id. at 164–65. Justice Blackmun added a caveat here, however, stating that abortions 
may only be proscribed “except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for 
the preservation of the life or health of the mother.” Id. at 165.  
 94. See id. at 153 (“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, 
or . . . in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to 
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).  
 95. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to 
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 386 (1985) (suggesting that the Roe rationale was 
“weakened” by a reliance upon the Due Process Clause, rather than the Equal Protection 
Clause); see also David Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the 
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The inconsistently applied, sliding-scale, strict scrutiny of the trimester 
framework was likewise criticized in the years that followed.96 It would be 
almost twenty years after Roe, however, before the Court fully re-visited 
the trimester scheme’s constitutional implications. The intervening period 
saw lively debate, both on and off the Supreme Court bench.97  
Shortly after her confirmation in 1981, for instance, Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor predicted both the collapse of the trimester framework and the 
adoption of the undue-burden standard almost a decade before they 
occurred.98 An “‘unduly burdensome’ standard should be applied to the 
challenged regulations throughout the entire pregnancy without reference to 
the particular ‘stage’ of pregnancy involved,” the first female Supreme 
Court justice wrote in her dissent in City of Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health.99 “If the particular regulation does not ‘unduly 
burden’ the fundamental right, then our evaluation of that regulation is 
limited to our determination that the regulation rationally relates to a 
legitimate state purpose,”100 she elaborated. 
O’Connor and others--such as Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who echoed her 
reasoning101--criticized not only the difficulties with the trimester approach, 
                                                                                                                 
Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 56 (2003) (contending that 
“Griswold and Roe’s protection of the unenumerated right to privacy raises many of the 
same issues as Lochner’s protection of the unenumerated right to liberty of contract”).  
 96. See, e.g., R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Planned Parenthood v. Casey Abortion 
Rights Law: Strict Scrutiny for Substantial Obstacles on Abortion Choice and Otherwise 
Reasonableness Balancing, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 75, 80, 82 (2015) (puzzling over the fact 
that “[u]nder Roe v. Wade, any burden on that woman’s fundamental right triggered a strict 
scrutiny approach,” although in the 1970s within other contexts, such as parental-notification 
statutes, the “Court appeared to apply intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny”). 
 97. See generally MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE (2015) (discussing the ideological battle 
over abortion that raged in the 1970s). See also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976) 
(upholding on procedural grounds a Massachusetts law that required minors to obtain 
consent from their parents prior to terminating their pregnancies—and foreshadowing the 
undue-burden test by stating that “a requirement of written consent on the part of a pregnant 
adult is not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion”). Three 
years later, the Court revisited the matter and held that states may require parental 
notification prior to a minor obtaining an abortion, yet such rules require corresponding 
allowances for alternative channels to parental approval, such as seeking a judge’s approval 
instead. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979). 
 98. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. (citation omitted). 
 101. Ginsburg, supra note 95, at 381 (quoting large passages of Justice O’Connor’s 
opinions). 
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but also the irony of the ostensibly rigid trimester standard: “Just as 
improvements in medical technology inevitably will move forward the 
point at which the State may regulate for reasons of maternal health,” 
Justice O’Connor pointed out, “different technological improvements will 
move backward the point of viability . . . . The Roe framework, then, is 
clearly on a collision course with itself.”102 
Indeed, the collision occurred in 1992 in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.103 The case examined the 
constitutionality of Pennsylvania laws that mandated, among other items, 
twenty-four-hour waiting periods and spousal notifications for women 
seeking abortions.104 Although the constitutionality of abortion itself was 
putatively not open for reconsideration in Casey, the post-Roe addition of 
several conservative justices suggested to many that Roe’s central holding 
was in jeopardy.105  
Writing for the Casey plurality, however, Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, 
Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter declared that ignoring nineteen years 
of stare decisis by overturning Roe would harm judicial legitimacy.106 
Therefore, to maintain both jurisprudential integrity and the abortion-liberty 
interest, the Casey Court, in the words of Mary Ziegler, “steered a middle 
course.”107 It upheld the essence of Roe, yet permitted certain abortion 
restrictions to stand.108 
                                                                                                                 
 102. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 456-58. 
 103. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 104. Id. at 844. The five provisions at issue were: (1) mandatory twenty-four-hour 
informed consent for those seeking abortions; (2) spousal notice requirement for those 
seeking abortions; (3) parental consent for minors seeking abortions; (4) reporting and 
record-keeping requirements for abortion providers; and (5) the definition of the phrase 
“medical emergency” for abortion-related purposes. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203–20 (1990).  
 105. See ZIEGLER, supra note 97, at 224 (“Over the course of the 1980s, Republican 
nominees to the Supreme Court expressed increasing skepticism about the trimester 
framework set out in the Roe decision. By 1992 Court watchers concluded that the justices 
might be ready to overrule the 1973 opinion.”). 
 106. Casey, 505 U.S. at 867 (“The country’s loss of confidence in the Judiciary would be 
underscored by an equally certain and equally reasonable condemnation for another failing 
in overruling unnecessarily and under pressure.”). 
 107. ZIEGLER, supra note 97, at 224. 
 108. The spousal-awareness provision was struck down, while the other four parts 
survived. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879–911.  
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At bottom, the fractured109 Casey Court made two key decisions. First, it 
reaffirmed Roe’s rationale that the onset of viability refashions the interests 
and rights involved, but abandoned the trimester approach as a proxy for 
viability.110 Second, the Court jettisoned strict scrutiny from abortion 
jurisprudence111 and replaced it with the undue-burden standard.112 The 
plurality introduced the new test by explaining that an “undue burden 
exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is 
to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion 
before the fetus attains viability.”113 
This innovative balancing test, described by the plurality as an 
“appropriate means of reconciling the State’s interest with the woman’s 
constitutionally protected liberty,”114 would not be triggered by mere 
attendant effects. Indeed, the Court opined that  
[n]umerous forms of state regulation might have the incidental 
effect of increasing the cost or decreasing the availability of 
medical care, whether for abortion or any other medical 
procedure. The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one 
not designed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect 
of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an 
abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it.115 
Aside, however, from particular statements declaring certain parts of the 
Pennsylvania law as either unduly burdensome or not, the opinion clarified 
little about what the new standard practically entailed.116 An additional 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See Elizabeth A. Schneider, Comment, Workability of the Undue Burden Test, 66 
TEMP. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (1993) (“No less than three different rationales are used by 
members of the Casey Court in analyzing the Pennsylvania provisions upheld in Casey.”). 
 110. Casey, 505 U.S at 878. 
 111. Id. Although they concurred in the holding itself, Justices Harry Blackmun and John 
Paul Stevens would have retained both the trimester approach and the use of strict scrutiny 
in abortion cases. See id. at 930 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Strict scrutiny of state 
limitations on reproductive choice still offers the most secure protection of the woman’s 
right to make her own reproductive decisions . . . . [T]he trimester framework ha[s] not been 
undermined, and the Roe framework is far more administrable, and far less manipulable, 
than the ‘undue burden’ standard.” (citation omitted)). 
 112. Id. at 874 (plurality opinion). 
 113. Id. at 878 (emphasis added).  
 114. Id. at 876.  
 115. Id. at 874.  
 116. See Schneider, supra note 109, at 1004 (explaining one year after the Casey decision 
that abortion rights were going to be curtailed because the “discretionary nature of the undue 
burden test renders it unworkable. It is a standard which cannot be applied by state courts 
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troubling aspect of the opinion was that the scant explanation tended to be 
confusing and self-referential. After explaining, for instance, that the 
undue-burden concept is a heuristic for illegitimate government intent that 
abridges a fundamental right, the Court somewhat circularly stated that “[a] 
finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state 
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion.”117  
After allowing for three years of ferment, Professor Erin Daly 
summarized Casey in less-than-flattering terms: 
Casey is a remarkably splintered and confusing opinion . . . . The 
lead opinion is so fractured that, as the maze of concurrences and 
dissents illustrate, there is something in it for everyone to hate. 
Indeed, Casey has received almost nothing but criticism: pro-
lifers have derided its continued protection of abortion, while 
pro-choicers have lamented its support of significant abortion 
restrictions.118 
Adoption of the undue-burden standard, in particular, received 
significant criticism. Aside from the lack of clarity regarding how many 
women a regulation must affect to constitute an undue burden,119 another 
common critique was the lack of clarity regarding the degree of causation 
necessary between a regulation and the putative burden it created. The 
Court “seems to be saying,” constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky 
wrote more than a decade after Casey, 
                                                                                                                 
consistently, predictably, and without prejudice. The Casey Court’s test invites judges to 
roam freely where speculation might take them” (footnote omitted)); see also Kelso, supra 
note 96, at 76–79 (describing practical difficulties that lower courts experienced in the 
ensuing years in applying the vaguely articulated undue-burden standard).  
 117. Casey, 505 U.S at 877. Another tail-chasing trouble, Erwin Chemerinsky points out, 
is that the Court  
says both that the state cannot act with the purpose of creating obstacles to 
abortion and that it can act with the purpose of discouraging abortion and 
encouraging childbirth. . . . How is it to be decided which of these laws is 
invalid as an undue burden and which is permissible? The joint opinion simply 
says that the regulation “must not be an undue burden on the right.” But this, of 
course, is circular. 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, at 864 (emphasis added).  
 118. Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhetoric of 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 77, 80 (1995) (footnote omitted).  
 119. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 864 (commenting on the Court’s use of the phrase 
“significant number of women” in the undue-burden analysis). 
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that an undue burden exists only if there is proof that the 
regulation will keep someone from getting an abortion. 
However, it must be questioned why burdens, no matter how 
substantial, are allowed unless they are actually proven to 
prevent abortions. Also, it is unclear how challengers will be 
able to prove that particular regulations create insurmountable 
obstacles to obtaining abortions.120 
Although the Court had several opportunities121 to clarify some of these 
ambiguities in the ensuing years, it remained mum until almost a quarter-
century later in 2016 when it decided Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt.122 Billed by Professor Jessie Hill as “the most important 
abortion case in over two decades,”123 Hellerstedt involved a challenge to 
two Texas laws adopted in 2013. The first required physicians who perform 
abortions to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles,124 
while the second required that abortion clinics comply with state 
regulations governing ambulatory surgical centers.125  
Texas contended that the statutes were a legitimate use of its power to 
further important interests in health and safety.126 Austin-based Whole 
Woman’s Health, a self-described “privately-owned feminist organization, 
committed to providing holistic care for women,”127 countered that the laws 
were unduly burdensome on fundamental reproductive rights by essentially 
regulating half of Texas’s abortion facilities out of business.128  
Writing for a five-to-three majority, Stephen Breyer focused much 
attention on analyzing a lengthy factual record. In so doing, he concluded 
that enforcement of the admitting-privileges requirement would indeed 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Id. 
 121. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 
546 U.S. 320 (2006); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).  
 122. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 123. Jessie Hill, Some Thoughts About Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (July 5, 2016), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/07/some-
thoughts-about-whole-womans-health-v-hellerstedt.html. 
 124. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a)(1)(A)) (2009); 25 TEX. ADMIN. 
CODE §§ 139.53(c)(1), 139.56(a)(1) (2013). 
 125. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.010(a) (West Cum. Supp. 2015); 25 TEX. 
ADMIN. CODE § 139.40 (2013). 
 126. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2300–01.  
 127. About Us, WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH, http://wholewomanshealth.com/about-us.html 
(last visited May 12, 2017). 
 128. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2313.  
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cause the closure of roughly half of Texas’s abortion clinics.129 The 
surgical-center requirement, likewise, was determined to inhibit access to 
reproductive care while simultaneously offering women little benefit, by 
way of health or safety, in return.130 The laws were thus deemed 
unconstitutional,131 with Justice Breyer writing that each statute both 
“places a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking a previability 
abortion”132 and “constitutes an undue burden on abortion access.”133 
The day after the decision, Supreme Court reporter Adam Liptak mused 
that “[i]f Casey limited the right established in Roe, allowing states to 
regulate abortion in ways Roe had barred, [Hellerstedt] effectively 
expanded that right.”134 Indeed, Professor Hill explained that “[b]y focusing 
on the health benefits of the law in relation to the burdens, the Court made 
sense of, and breathed new life into, the undue burden standard.”135 It did 
this in three important and practical ways that give teeth to the undue-
burden test.136  
First, the Court added Roe-like rigor to the standard by reshaping it—at 
least the means-end fit of it137—in a strict-scrutiny-like construction.138 In 
particular, Justice Breyer declared that even if a statute does not impose a 
“substantial obstacle” to abortion access, it must nonetheless be more than 
“reasonably related to (or designed to further) a legitimate state interest.”139 
This means that even if a regulation furthers a “legitimate” interest, the 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 2315. 
 131. Id. at 2320. 
 132. Id. at 2300. 
 133. Id.  
 134. Adam Liptak, Justices Overturn Texas Abortion Limits, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2016, 
at A1. 
 135. Hill, supra note 123.  
 136. As Georgetown Professor David Cole writes, the Hellerstedt “decision gives teeth to 
the ‘undue burden’ standard that the court announced in 1992 in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey.” David Cole, Justice Kennedy’s Surprisingly Open Mind, WASH. POST (June 27, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/justice-kennedys-surpisingly-open-mind/ 
2016/06/27/6e217886-3c98-11e6-84e8-1580c7db5275_story.html. 
 137. See infra notes 148–153 and accompanying text (explaining how the undue-burden 
test, although similar to strict scrutiny, deviates from the Court’s most exacting standard in 
that the undue-burden test is more holistic).  
 138. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2324 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining how the decision 
“transform[ed] the undue-burden test to something much more akin to strict scrutiny”).  
 139. Id. at 2309 (majority opinion). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss4/2
2017]        THE UNDUE-BURDEN STANDARD 645 
 
 
nexus between the regulation and the interest must be exceptionally strong 
in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny.140 
The second clarification regards deference. Specifically, it instructs 
lower courts that, when an abortion regulation’s justifications are not 
medically certain, they should not defer to lawmakers’ judgments.141 
Instead, reviewing courts should engage in careful assessment to determine 
the compellingness and interest-regulation linkage by scrutinizing the 
record itself.142 As Justice Breyer wrote, the undue-burden test entails 
placing “considerable weight upon evidence and argument presented in 
judicial proceedings.”143  
Professor Hill thus asserts Breyer’s “opinion made it clear that courts are 
not to defer to legislatures on the medical or scientific issues that underlie 
abortion restrictions; instead, they should examine the evidence 
independently and critically.”144 The result, contends Professor Mary 
Ziegler, is a “more rigorous undue burden test. . . . That means that 
legislatures claiming to protect women’s health will need proof that a law 
actually does so.”145 Similarly, former Supreme Court reporter and current 
Yale Law School lecturer Linda Greenhouse writes that Hellerstedt 
mandates that “evidence-based medicine meets evidence-based law.”146 
The third change to the undue-burden standard is more general, but still 
very important. It restructures the test to be more holistic and 
comprehensive in nature, which should not be surprising in an opinion 
authored by Justice Breyer.147 This doctrinal amendment requires courts not 
only to examine the burdens imposed on abortion but also to “consider the 
burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those 
                                                                                                                 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 2310. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. For instance, in evaluating the admitting-privileges requirement, Breyer cited 
evidence in the judicial record including peer-reviewed studies, expert testimony, and data 
from friend-of-the-court briefs. Id. at 2311–14.  
 144. Hill, supra note 123. 
 145. Mary Ziegler, The Supreme Court’s Texas Abortion Ruling Reignites a Battle over 
Facts, WASH. POST (June 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/ 
2016/06/28/the-supreme-courts-texas-abortion-ruling-reignites-a-battle-over-facts/?utm_ te 
rm=.714b92e221f2. 
 146. Linda Greenhouse, The Facts Win Out on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/opinion/the-facts-win-out-on-abortion.html.  
 147. See supra note 6 for a discussion of Justice Breyer’s propensity toward “free-form 
balancing.” 
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laws confer.”148 Whereas the Court in Casey only evaluated the burdens 
imposed on obtaining an abortion, the Hellerstedt majority requires these 
burdens to be weighed against the alleged benefits of the regulation.149 In 
brief, the burdens and benefits must be balanced.150 Justice Breyer thus 
lauded the district court in Hellerstedt for applying “the correct legal 
standard”151 when it gave “significant weight to evidence in the judicial 
record,”152 including expert testimony, and “then weighed the asserted 
benefits against the burdens.”153 
Collectively, these changes make the undue-burden test a far more 
rigorous test for evaluating government restrictions and provide courts—
even appellate courts—with a large degree of discretion to engage in 
detailed factual analyses.154 The practical upshot is, in the words of 
Professor Ziegler, that any future challenges to abortion rights are going to 
become “a battle over facts,”155 forcing supporters of abortion regulations 
to have more (and more persuasive) evidence of the regulations’ benefits in 
order to demonstrate their constitutionality.156  
                                                                                                                 
 148. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (emphasis added). Practically, Justice Breyer 
explained, this simply means engaging in a balancing test. Justice Breyer’s full quotation 
states that the undue-burden standard requires that lower courts  
consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the 
benefits those laws confer. See [Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey] 505 U.S., at 887 (opinion of the Court) (performing this 
balancing with respect to a spousal notification provision); id., at 899-901 
(joint opinion of O’Connor, KENNEDY, and Souter, JJ.) (same balancing with 
respect to a parental notification provision).  
Id. (emphasis added) (parallel citations omitted).  
 149. See Elizabeth Price Foley, Whole Woman’s Health and the Supreme Court’s 
Kaleidoscopic Review of Constitutional Rights, 2015-16 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 153, 172 (“The 
Casey plurality assessed only the burdens of the medical emergency, informed consent, 
parental consent, spousal notification, and recordkeeping provisions of Pennsylvania’s 
abortion law.”). 
 150. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2309. 
 151. Id. at 2310. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id.  
 154. See Michael Dorf, Symposium: The Wages of Guerilla Warfare Against Abortion, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2016, 5:12 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-
the-wages-of-guerrilla-warfare-against-abortion/ (writing that some courts may not even 
need to look at subjective legislative intent if they don’t want to and may instead look at the 
factual, practical effects of the law(s) in question). 
 155. Ziegler, supra note 145.  
 156. See id. (“Those on both sides will have to pull together extensive, persuasive and 
often expensive trial evidence about the effect and purpose of an abortion regulation.”).  
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 “The Court was clear,” Erwin Chemerinsky wrote soon after the 
decision, “that the judiciary must carefully scrutinize laws restricting 
abortion that are adopted with the purported justification of protecting 
women’s health. The majority rejected judicial deference to legislatures.”157 
He added that the Court “stressed that in deciding whether a law imposes an 
undue burden on abortion it is for the judiciary to balance the justifications 
for the restrictions against their effect on the ability of women to have 
access to abortions.”158 
Thus, if the undue-burden test were applied to evaluate the 
constitutionality of a government-imposed TPM restriction on speech, it 
would 
 1. Require the government to proffer a detailed factual record 
demonstrating that the speech-restricting law actually serves and benefits a 
significant interest; 
2. Allow those challenging the government regulation to provide their 
own factual evidence, including expert testimony, of the ways in which the 
law unduly burdens the First Amendment freedom of speech to the point of 
creating a substantial obstacle in conveying messages effectively; and 
3. Require courts to (a) not defer to legislative judgment; (b) carefully 
scrutinize the factual evidentiary record illustrating both the purported 
benefits of the regulation in serving a significant governmental interest and 
the alleged burdens on speakers, their messages, and audiences; and (c) 
determine whether those burdens, viewed in the aggregate, impose a 
substantial obstacle on the First Amendment freedom of speech.  
In summary, Hellerstedt added muscle to the undue-burden standard by 
requiring courts to factually assess and balance all interests involved—and 
all benefits and burdens of the regulation—and by making it clear that 
courts should not defer to legislative fact-findings or judgments.159 
Especially in light of the standard’s newfound clarity, then, Part II explains 
why importing the doctrine into a different constitutional context seems 
neither unusual nor surprising. 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Erwin Chemerinsky, Everything Changed: October Term 2015, 19 GREEN BAG 2d 
343, 355 (2016). 
 158. Id. 
 159. See Foley, supra note 149, at 175 (observing that in Hellerstedt the majority 
“provided no deference at all to the Texas legislature’s factual findings regarding the 
benefits to be derived from the admitting-privileges or surgical-center provisions,” while 
simultaneously “deferring to the district court’s findings of fact”). 
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II. Borrowing the Undue-Burden Standard from Abortion Cases: 
A Tradition of Cutting Across Constitutional Domains 
The possibility of borrowing the undue-burden standard from the realm 
of substantive due process in abortion-restriction cases and applying it to 
First Amendment speech disputes should not be startling.160 That is 
because, as Professor Randall Kelso writes, “[t]he structure of modern First 
Amendment free speech doctrine . . . has evolved consistent with the more 
formalized structure of doctrine under modern Equal Protection and Due 
Process review.”161  
Writing more than forty years ago in the University of Chicago Law 
Review, Professor Kenneth Karst observed that “[i]n a number of recent 
cases involving first amendment interests, the Supreme Court has used the 
framework of equal protection analysis to limit government’s power to 
restrict free expression.”162 Karst pointed to the Court’s opinion in Police 
Department of Chicago v. Mosley163 as “fully”164 enunciating the principle 
that “equal liberty of expression is inherent in the first amendment.”165 In 
Mosley, the Court considered the constitutionality of a municipal picketing 
ordinance.166 The ordinance distinguished protected from unprotected 
speech based on subject matter, as it allowed “[p]eaceful picketing on the 
subject of a school’s labor-management dispute”167 but banned “all other 
peaceful picketing.”168 In holding the regulation unconstitutional and 
delivering the Court’s opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall explained that 
under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First 
Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum 
                                                                                                                 
 160. See generally Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. 
L. REV. 459 (2010) (providing a thorough overview of “constitutional borrowing”). 
 161. R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny, 
Intermediate Review, and “Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291, 291 (2016); 
see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 
297, 304 (1997) (“Although the three-tiered approach is rooted in the Equal Protection 
Clause, it has spread to other areas of constitutional law. In recent years, the Court’s First 
Amendment free speech jurisprudence, originally distinct from its equal protection 
jurisprudence, has entirely succumbed to the tiered-review model.”). 
 162. Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 20, 20–21 (1975). 
 163. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
 164. Karst, supra note 162, at 26.  
 165. Id.  
 166. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92–93.  
 167. Id. at 95. 
 168. Id.  
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to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those 
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views. 
And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or 
debating in public facilities. There is an “equality of status in the 
field of ideas,” and government must afford all points of view an 
equal opportunity to be heard.169  
More recently, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in Simon & Schuster, 
Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board170 that the 
requirements under strict scrutiny in First Amendment jurisprudence that a 
law must serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly drawn “derive[] 
from our equal protection jurisprudence.”171 Tracing back through a line of 
free speech cases,172 Kennedy contends that “a principle of equal protection 
[was] transformed into one about the government’s power to regulate the 
content of speech in a public forum, and from this to a more general First 
Amendment statement about the government’s power to regulate the 
content of speech.”173 Thus, the strict-scrutiny doctrine today “spans equal 
protection, substantive due process, and the First Amendment.”174  
Similarly, as Professor Jeffery Shaman writes, the intermediate-scrutiny 
standard “was first developed in equal protection cases”175 and then was 
“imported for use in First Amendment cases concerning commercial 
speech . . . and in those freedom of speech cases in which restrictions of 
expression are unrelated to its ideological content.”176 Professor Bhagwat 
notes that the evolution of a unified intermediate-scrutiny standard in First 
Amendment jurisprudence “paralleled, and drew upon, the emergence of an 
                                                                                                                 
 169. Id. at 96 (footnote omitted) (quoting A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1948). 
 170. 502 U.S. 105 (1991). 
 171. Id. at 124 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 
 172. Among the key cases cited by Justice Kennedy is Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 
(1980), in which the Court wrote that “[w]hen government regulation discriminates among 
speech-related activities in a public forum, the Equal Protection Clause mandates that the 
legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial state interests, and the justifications offered 
for any distinctions it draws must be carefully scrutinized.” Id. at 461–62.  
 173. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 125 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).  
 174. Roy G. Spece, Jr. & David Yokum, Scrutinizing Strict Scrutiny, 40 VT. L. REV. 285, 
317 (2015). 
 175. Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels 
of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 163 (1984). 
 176. Id.  
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intermediate scrutiny tier of review as the test for sex discrimination in the 
equal protection arena[].”177 
The bottom line is that First Amendment jurisprudence long has 
borrowed doctrinal principles from other realms of constitutional law. Thus, 
to dip into the sphere of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process 
and, in particular, the undue-burden standard fits within the historical 
trajectory of First Amendment doctrinal development. The next part 
explains and defends the relevance of the undue-burden standard as a 
potential facet of intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment. 
III. Exploring the Application of the Undue-Burden Standard 
in Free-Speech Cases Involving Intermediate Scrutiny 
This part includes two sections. Initially, Section A identifies five 
reasons why the undue-burden standard fits well within intermediate 
scrutiny as applied to TPM restrictions on expression. Section B then 
operationalizes the meaning of undue burden within a free-speech context 
and identifies variables that courts should consider in evaluating whether a 
TPM regulation imposes an undue burden on freedom of speech. 
A. The Nexus Between Undue Burden and Intermediate Scrutiny 
There are at least five reasons why merging the undue-burden standard 
with intermediate scrutiny is prudent and appealing. First, both the undue-
burden and intermediate-scrutiny standards apply where the government 
does not completely prohibit conduct or speech, but instead imposes 
regulatory hurdles or impediments that make engaging in such activity or 
expression more difficult and challenging. For example, Texas did not ban 
abortions in Hellerstedt. Instead, it instituted admitting-privileges and 
surgical-center requirements that made obtaining an abortion more difficult, 
and the Court applied the undue-burden standard to measure their 
constitutionality.178 
Similarly, Massachusetts in McCullen v. Coakley179 did not ban people 
from communicating with women approaching facilities that perform 
abortions. Instead, it imposed buffer zones around such clinics that made it 
more difficult to speak with individuals entering them, and the majority 
applied the intermediate-scrutiny standard to measure their 
                                                                                                                 
 177. Bhagwat, supra note 4, at 784. 
 178. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016). 
 179. 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). 
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constitutionality.180 In brief, both the undue-burden and intermediate-
scrutiny tests are designed for evaluating burdens, not bans. 
Second, application of the undue-burden standard in the context of 
intermediate scrutiny comports with the current “balancing-oriented”181 
nature of intermediate scrutiny. Indeed, Justice Elena Kagan has described 
content-neutral regulations of speech as being “usually . . . subject to a 
fairly loose balancing test.”182 And Professor Alan Brownstein writes that 
the judicial standard for evaluating content-neutral TPM regulations is “a 
multifactor balancing test.”183 He adds that “[t]he burden imposed by a 
content-neutral law . . . no matter how egregious it may be, is always 
balanced against the state interest being furthered by the restriction on 
speech.”184 
The undue-burden test, as articulated in Hellerstedt, also amounts to a 
“benefits-and-burdens balancing test.”185  Indeed, Professor Brownstein 
noted the similarities between the undue-burden test and intermediate 
scrutiny more than two decades ago, writing that “under both the Casey 
standard and the balancing test applied to content-neutral regulations, laws 
that serve permissible goals are evaluated as to their impact on the exercise 
of fundamental rights to determine if they are excessively burdensome.”186 
Similarly, Professors Jud Mathews and Alec Stone Sweet observed in 2011 
that the undue-burden standard, “like the move to intermediate scrutiny, is a 
means to allow courts to consider the interests on both sides of a 
constitutional controversy.”187 
Justice Breyer, who authored the Hellerstedt majority opinion, used the 
language of burdens in describing the intermediate-scrutiny test he applied 
when concurring in United States v. Alvarez.188 As Breyer wrote there, the 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Id. at 2534–35.  
 181. Han, supra note 8, at 396. 
 182. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in 
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 443 (1996). 
 183. Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in 
Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 920 (1994). 
 184. Id. at 923.  
 185. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2324 (2016) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); see Thomas J. Molony, Fulfilling the Promise of Roe: A Pathway for 
Meaningful Pre-Abortion Consultation, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 713, 734 (2016) (referring to 
“the balancing test described in Hellerstedt”). 
 186. Brownstein, supra note 183, at 925. 
 187. Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights 
Review and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 854 (2011). 
 188. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
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Court had to “ask whether it is possible substantially to achieve the 
Government’s objective in less burdensome ways.”189  
Third, the undue-burden standard subsumes the current concern under 
intermediate scrutiny with the availability of ample alternative channels of 
communication.190 In particular, if use of alternative channels of 
communication left open by a TPM regulation would impose a greater 
fiscal cost to a speaker and/or require substantially more time and energy in 
order to convey, as effectively, the same message, then such heightened 
costs are evidence under the undue-burden analysis weighing against 
constitutional validity.191 In other words, forcing speakers to embrace 
avenues of communication that carry greater monetary or human-capital 
outlays may constitute undue burdens. Alternative avenues of 
communication may not be ample—as in sufficient or adequate192—when 
they create undue burdens for speakers.  
Fourth, both the undue-burden standard and the intermediate-scrutiny 
test are intended to be somewhat easier to surmount than strict scrutiny but 
more demanding than rational basis review.193 In other words, the undue-
burden and intermediate-scrutiny tests ostensibly aim for the same level of 
judicial review. In fact, several scholars consider the undue-burden standard 
                                                                                                                 
 189. Id. at 2555 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Breyer wrote that the 
circumstances in Alvarez “lead me to apply what the Court has termed ‘intermediate 
scrutiny’ here.” Id. at 2552. 
 190. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (describing this prong of the current 
intermediate-scrutiny test). 
 191. See infra notes 221-224 and accompanying text (describing this in greater detail in 
the context of the Supreme Court’s ruling in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994)). 
 192. Ample, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/ample (last visited 
May 12, 2017). 
 193. See Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional 
Exceptionalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 417 (2008) (noting that “the strongest presumption 
of unconstitutionality [is] reflected in the strict-scrutiny test,” while “[m]any, if not most, 
constitutional rights are protected by the lesser presumptions of the undue burden and 
intermediate scrutiny tests, or by what is effectively the nonpresumption reflected in the two 
types of rational basis tests” (emphasis added)); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, What the Abortion 
Disclosure Cases Say About the Constitutionality of Persuasive Government Speech on 
Product Labels, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 855, 860 (2010) (describing intermediate scrutiny as “a 
standard between the rigorous strict scrutiny that applies to other speech regulations and the 
rational basis standard that the Court uses to review regulations that do not implicate the free 
speech right”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 22, 61 (1992) (“The label ‘intermediate scrutiny’ situates these standards 
between the bipolar rule-like tiers of strict review and rationality review.”). 
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a form of intermediate scrutiny.194 Professor Adam Winkler adds that “the 
undue burden test is clearly more tolerant of regulation than traditional 
strict scrutiny.”195 
Fifth—and perhaps most importantly, at least from the perspective of 
First Amendment advocates—the undue-burden test, as articulated in 
Hellerstedt, would add significant teeth to an intermediate-scrutiny standard 
often criticized as too weak.196 In fact, in arguing against the majority’s 
decision in Hellerstedt, Justice Clarence Thomas opined that the undue-
burden standard now looks “far more like the strict-scrutiny standard”197 
than it did in Casey. Similarly, in applying the undue-burden standard in 
July 2016, an Ohio appellate court observed that the Court in Hellerstedt 
“set forth a more exacting undue burden standard.”198  
On top of this, the undue-burden standard fleshed out in Hellerstedt is 
favorable to free speech in the face of government regulation because, as 
Dean Chemerinsky notes, “[t]he majority rejected judicial deference to 
legislatures.”199 This is critical for improving protection of free expression 
because, in contrast, the intermediate-scrutiny standard for TPM regulations 
has been described by former Stanford Law School Dean Kathleen Sullivan 
as “relatively deferential.”200 Stripping away deference from intermediate 
                                                                                                                 
 194. See Edith L. Pacillo, Expanding the Feminist Imagination: An Analysis of 
Reproductive Rights, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 113, 117 n.20 (1997) (“The Court’s singular 
‘undue burden’ standard is reminiscent of the Court’s ‘intermediate scrutiny’ standard 
created to differentiate between racial classifications and gender classifications.”); Paulsen, 
supra note 1, at 398 (asserting that the undue-burden standard “seems to be some form of 
intermediate scrutiny”); Roy G. Spece, Jr., The Purpose Prong of Casey’s Undue Burden 
Test and Its Impact on the Constitutionality of Abortion Insurance Restrictions in the 
Affordable Care Act or Its Progeny, 33 WHITTIER L. REV. 77, 79 (2011) (asserting that after 
Casey, the right to an abortion “is protected by the intermediate scrutiny of the undue burden 
test rather than by strict scrutiny” (emphasis added)). But see Erin Daly, supra note 118, at 
144 n.345 (asserting that the undue-burden standard is distinguished “from intermediate 
scrutiny in that it does not permit the government to justify the regulation: even the most 
compelling purpose will not save a law if it is found to impose an undue burden”). 
 195. Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST. 
COMMENT. 227, 235 (2006). 
 196. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 197. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2326 (2016) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 198. Capital Care Network of Toledo v. State Dep’t of Health, 58 N.E.3d 1207, 1215 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2016) (emphasis added), appeal allowed sub nom. Capital Care Network of 
Toledo v. Ohio Dep't of Health, 71 N.E.3d 297 (Ohio Mar. 15, 2017) (table decision). 
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scrutiny in First Amendment jurisprudence is crucial, given “that 
deference’s elasticity makes it ripe for misuse and abuse that often leave 
First Amendment rights hanging out to dry.”201 Jettisoning deference from 
the intermediate-scrutiny equation would help to ensure that intermediate 
scrutiny truly is a standard that, as Professor David Han contends, “does not 
preordain victory for one side or the other.”202 
In brief, the undue-burden standard comports with intermediate 
scrutiny’s present framework as a balancing test that falls somewhere below 
the rigor of strict scrutiny while simultaneously adding strength to 
intermediate-scrutiny review by (a) mandating vigilant judicial review of 
the factual record, (b) requiring thorough analysis of both benefits and 
burdens imposed by regulations, (c) denying deference to legislative 
judgments, and (d) limiting judicial discretion. Judicial discretion is limited 
by requiring more in-depth factual analysis instead of speculation regarding 
benefits and burdens. In addition, replacing both the narrow-tailoring and 
ample-alternative-channels prongs of intermediate scrutiny with the undue-
burden approach streamlines intermediate scrutiny to a two-part test—one 
requiring a significant government interest served by a regulation that does 
not unduly burden speech. This change thereby eliminates the danger of 
conflating the current second and third prongs described by Professor 
Wright.203 
B. Operationalizing Undue Burden Within Intermediate Scrutiny 
How might the undue-burden standard operate as the second prong of an 
intermediate-scrutiny test for reviewing content-neutral TPM regulations? 
First, identification of a government interest as “significant” under 
intermediate scrutiny would be determined independently from the question 
of whether a regulation actually serves that interest without imposing an 
undue burden on speech. In other words, the undue-burden facet of a 
reformulated intermediate-scrutiny standard would apply only to the 
“means” side of the equation, not to the “ends.” This comports with the 
two-pronged nature of strict scrutiny, in which recognition of a compelling 
government interest is independent from the question of whether the 
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regulation in question restricts no more speech than is necessary to serve 
that interest.204 
Second, the undue-burden prong of a refashioned intermediate-scrutiny 
test would require courts to consider, per the majority’s balancing analysis 
in Hellerstedt, the benefits of a government regulation of expression, as 
well as the burdens it imposes on the First Amendment right of free speech. 
Because the Hellerstedt explication of the undue-burden test eliminates 
legislative deference, the government must put into the judicial record 
factual proof of the actual benefits that any given TPM restriction serves. 
The government would need to substantiate, in other words, that prior to 
imposing the regulation, its allegedly significant interest sustained actual 
harm that was mitigated or reduced after the regulation was imposed. Put 
differently, the government would need pre-regulation and post-regulation 
comparison points to demonstrate actual alleviation or mitigation of a 
problem to show a benefit toward the significant government interest.  
Such a requirement comports squarely with the intermediate-scrutiny 
standard already deployed by the Supreme Court in the commercial speech 
arena.205 As the Court wrote more than thirty-five years ago in Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,206 the 
government must prove that “the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted.”207 In other words, the government must 
demonstrate that there is a direct benefit from the regulation of speech. The 
Court later elaborated in Edenfield v. Fane208 that “a governmental body 
seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that 
the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them 
to a material degree.”209 The Edenfield Court added that “[t]his burden is 
not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture.”210  
In context of TPM regulations, adding Hellerstedt’s undue-burden 
approach to intermediate scrutiny brings the test much more in line with the 
variation of intermediate scrutiny already applied in commercial-speech 
cases by forcing the government to prove direct, material benefits from a 
                                                                                                                 
 204. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text (comparing strict scrutiny with 
intermediate scrutiny on the ends/means prongs of both current tests). 
 205. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001) (noting that the Court 
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 206. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
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 209. Id. at 770–71 (emphasis added). 
 210. Id. at 770. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
656 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:623 
 
 
regulation. Speculation and conjecture simply won’t suffice;211 as in 
Hellerstedt, a factual record of benefits is one key necessary for a 
regulation to withstand an undue-burden analysis as imported into 
intermediate scrutiny. 
Furthermore, the degree or size of the purported benefit of a content-
neutral restriction on expression must be considered, relative to all other 
variables that also may negatively impact the government’s asserted 
significant interest. For instance, if the government alleges that a significant 
interest in aesthetics is served by banning residential, yard-posted signs 
over a certain size, regardless of the subject matter of those signs, then the 
benefits to the aesthetics of the community wrought by this regulation 
would need to be placed within a macro-context of other factors 
detrimentally affecting community aesthetics. Although there might be a 
benefit to aesthetics from such a size-of-sign regulation, the level of 
improvement to the overall aesthetics of the community—the magnitude of 
the benefit—might be insignificant or de minimis because so many other 
unregulated variables may continue to plague community aesthetics.212 Per 
Edenfield, this would not provide a benefit “to a material degree.”213 
Trying to fathom the actual size or scale of the regulatory benefit is vital 
because it must be weighed against the burdens imposed on speech. The 
smaller the size or degree of the benefit, in turn, the more likely it is to be 
outweighed by burdens imposed on First Amendment rights in the undue-
burden formulation. 
Importantly, evaluating the magnitude of the actual benefit to the 
government’s interest under the undue-burden approach blends seamlessly 
with the Supreme Court’s underinclusivity doctrine. As Chief Justice John 
Roberts recently explained in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,214 
“[u]nderinclusivity creates a First Amendment concern when the State 
regulates one aspect of a problem while declining to regulate a different 
aspect of the problem that affects its stated interest in a comparable 
way.”215 Put differently, if the government regulates too little speech to 
prevent or mitigate a particular type of harm—the harm constituting “the 
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problem,”216 as Roberts called it—that “vast swaths”217 of unregulated 
speech continue to produce, then a law may be fatally underinclusive. As 
attorney James Ianelli explains, a statute is underinclusive if it “fails to 
reach much of the speech that implicates the government’s interest.”218 
In brief, Hellerstedt’s emphasis on the degree of a demonstrable benefit 
from a government regulation219 under the undue-burden standard comports 
with the Supreme Court’s concern regarding the constitutionality of laws 
that confer de minimis benefits. Adding the undue-burden analysis to 
intermediate scrutiny, in other words, provides a built-in mechanism for 
ferreting out underinclusive TPM restrictions. 
In addition to the government’s obligation to proffer evidence of the 
benefits of a TPM regulation, the undue-burden standard would afford 
those attacking the regulation the opportunity to demonstrate how the 
regulation imposes an undue burden on First Amendment speech rights. To 
better understand the burdens that might be imposed on expression by a 
content-neutral TPM, it is useful to divide potential burdens into three 
categories. Specifically, burdens from a TPM regulation might befall: 
• speakers; 
• audiences; and 
• messages.  
The question becomes whether, when viewed collectively across these 
three domains (speaker, audience, and message), the burdens rise in the 
aggregate to the level of—per the nomenclature of the undue-burden test—
a substantial obstacle or obstacles on freedom of expression.220  
How might a TPM regulation burden speakers? By restricting a 
particular mode, venue, or timeframe for expression (or some combination 
thereof), a TPM regulation can force speakers both to spend more money 
and to devote greater time and effort to convey their message in a way that 
may or may not be as effective as the method prohibited by the regulation. 
In other words, the burdens on speakers who attempt to convey a message 
in a manner as efficacious as that thwarted by a TPM regulation may be 
both fiscal and exertive. The Supreme Court made it clear in City of Ladue 
v. Gilleo221 that eliminating “an unusually cheap and convenient”222 method 
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of communication may be grounds for striking down a TPM regulation.223 
A particular mode of communication—in Gilleo, it was yard signs—may be 
“both unique and important.”224  
Consider, for instance, a TPM regulation that prohibits leafletting 
directly to people within fifteen yards of City Hall between the business 
hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. in order to serve significant interests in (1) 
the ingress and egress of government employees, lobbyists, and other 
visitors to and from the building; and (2) safe facilitation of all foot traffic 
on the narrow and normally crowded sidewalks that surround the 
building.225 With this low-cost and direct approach to communicating a 
message to those who may hold positions of (or be influencers of) 
government power blocked, a speaker would need to adopt more expensive 
and time-intensive measures—and, importantly, less direct ways—of trying 
to reach his or her desired audience. Those might include, for example, 
having to (1) purchase newspaper, television, and/or Internet 
advertisements; (2) send mass mailings; and (3) rent billboard space. 
A TPM regulation can also burden audiences—something a 
comprehensive and detailed undue-burden approach to intermediate 
scrutiny would address. In particular, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
recognized an unenumerated First Amendment right to receive speech.226 
As Professor Catherine Ross explains, “[t]he right to receive information is 
a corollary of the right to speak.”227 Indeed, “courts have recognized in a 
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variety of contexts that a right to free speech is not held just by speakers. 
Listeners, too, have a First Amendment right to receive speech.”228 
Thus, in considering the constitutionality of a TPM regulation, a court 
would need to consider how the regulation burdens the ability of potential 
audience members to receive speech. For example, an ordinance banning or 
limiting the number of all newsracks, regardless of the content of the 
publications they hold, in a particular space or location detrimentally affects 
not merely the right of publishers to convey speech, but also the right of 
individuals who may want to receive speech. Similarly, an ordinance 
limiting the number and size of yard signs that may be posted on a plot of 
residential property affects not only a homeowner’s right to speak—perhaps 
regarding political candidates or ballot initiatives—but also her neighbors’ 
ability to know how others, whom they may respect or loathe, might be 
voting. 
Finally, it is important for courts to consider how a message itself may 
be burdened by needing to take on a different form or be conveyed via 
another medium because of a TPM restriction. In other words, some modes 
and manners of message conveyance may be more efficacious than others, 
not only in terms of reaching a certain quantity of people, but also in terms 
of attracting attention, gaining understanding, facilitating persuasion and 
being remembered. Here, communication science229 might prove useful in 
helping courts to understand why a TPM regulation that thwarts a particular 
mode or manner of communication unduly burdens the underlying 
message.230 The use of expert testimony and data-driven findings in such 
areas comports with the Hellerstedt majority’s deployment of the undue-
burden standard in analyzing the benefits and burdens in that case.231 
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In considering the burdens imposed on a message, a comprehensive 
undue-burden analysis must also address what the Supreme Court in Cohen 
v. California232 called the “dual communicative function”233 of speech. As 
Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote in Cohen, speech “conveys not only 
ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise 
inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for 
their emotive as their cognitive force.”234  
In turn, some modes of message conveyance may be more effective than 
others in demonstrating the depth of a speaker’s passion and fervor for her 
message. For example, a TPM regulation limiting the decibel level of 
speech and/or banning speech-amplifying devices, such as microphones and 
bullhorns, arguably reduces the emotional impact of spoken words. If the 
alternative left open by such a regulation is the distribution of printed words 
on leaflets, then the emotive force of seeing and hearing a person express 
her views in a loud, passionate manner is burdened. 
Similarly, a content-neutral TPM regulation that limits billboards or yard 
signs to only words restricts the emotive force of a message conveyed by 
images. A text-only billboard stating, “Abortion Kills the Innocent,” for 
instance, may not pack the same degree of emotive and persuasive force as 
an image of a mangled fetus.235 As UCLA Professor Eugene Volokh 
asserts, “photographs can expose that which is otherwise hidden, with a 
vividness that words often cannot capture; images of aborted fetuses are an 
especially apt example.”236 
In summary, analysis of the burdens spread across the domains of 
speakers, audience members, and messages would collectively help the 
judiciary determine if the burden imposed on First Amendment rights is 
undue when balanced against the government-proven benefits of a TPM 
regulation. A demonstrably slight government-proven benefit might well be 
outweighed by aggregate burdens that are tantamount to a substantial 
obstacle in the way of First Amendment free expression. 
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IV. Conclusion 
Intermediate scrutiny today, Professor Lillian R. BeVier asserts, “has 
become the practical equivalent of lenient, rational basis review.”237 
Professor Susan Williams concurs that intermediate scrutiny, as it applies to 
TPM regulations, is a “fairly lenient standard.”238 That is bad news, of 
course, for advocates of free expression.  
This article thus proposed importing the Supreme Court’s undue-burden 
test from the realm of abortion-restriction cases like Hellerstedt into the 
intermediate-scrutiny standard of review for content-neutral TPM 
restrictions of expression. The proposal, in turn, called for eliminating both 
the narrow-tailoring and ample-alternative-channels prongs of the current 
intermediate-scrutiny test, while retaining the significant-interest facet. 
As argued above, the undue-burden standard articulated and applied by 
the Hellerstedt majority provides a more free-speech-friendly approach for 
evaluating TPM regulations by eliminating deference to lawmakers and 
requiring a fact-intensive, judicial inquiry into both the benefits of 
regulations and their burdens on First Amendment rights. Justice Elena 
Kagan once characterized the current version of intermediate scrutiny as 
providing “a fairly loose balancing test.”239 Blending in the undue-burden 
standard as clarified in Hellerstedt provides a key mechanism for reducing 
such looseness and elasticity, while preserving a balancing approach that 
adds muscle in deference-free fashion. Stripping away deference is 
important if intermediate scrutiny is to live up to its potential as a test that 
“allows the Court to take a neutral stance that favors neither the government 
nor the party challenging it.”240 
Although the undue-burden standard may be criticized as nothing more 
than a balancing test that provides the judiciary with leeway for its own 
discretion, it is important to remember that intermediate scrutiny already 
involves balancing.241 Furthermore, as the Introduction made clear, 
intermediate scrutiny has gained importance in First Amendment 
jurisprudence.242 Given this heightened value of intermediate scrutiny to 
free-speech jurisprudence, it is critical to review and reconsider the current 
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standard as to how it might be improved. Doctrines, after all, are not set in 
stone, but are judicial creations that can evolve.243 
The proposal here is presented for scholarly and judicial consideration 
and critique as a possible means of shoring up intermediate scrutiny in a 
way that makes it more difficult for the government to sustain regulations 
on expression. No series of brief hypothetical ordinances like those 
suggested in Section B of Part III, of course, can ever possibly capture all of 
the nuances of how a court might apply an intermediate-scrutiny standard 
that requires the government to demonstrate a significant interest and to 
show that a regulation does not unduly burden First Amendment rights. 
Indeed, Hellerstedt deployed the undue-burden standard in a highly fact-
intensive, evidentiary manner.244 Requiring courts to non-deferentially 
examine what Justice Breyer called “record evidence”245 provided by the 
government of an actual benefit served by a TPM regulation and, in turn, to 
weigh the size and scope of that benefit against demonstrable burdens 
imposed on First Amendment rights across the domains of speakers, 
audiences, and messages would mark a significant step toward eliminating 
substantial obstacles in the marketplace of ideas.246 
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